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WHEN IS A CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 
"SUBSTANTIALLY UNFIT TO SERVE"? 
JAYNE W. BARNARD* 
The recently enacted Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 provides that, in an SEC en-
forcement action, a federal court may enjoin or "disbar" the de-
fendant from serving in the future as an officer or director of a 
public company. A court may enter such an order if it finds that 
the defendant is "substantially unfit" to serve as a corporate ex-
ecutive,· the Act, however, does not define "substantial unfitness. " 
In this Article Professor Jayne Barnard provides a framework for 
defining this term and identifying the defendants to which the 
Remedies Act should apply. 
Professor Barnard begins by looking at the legislative his-
tory of the Act, but finds little guidance there. She then exam-
ines three lines of non-Act cases in which courts have addressed 
questions closely related to the question of executive unfitness. 
She rejects these models as well as a fourth, which derives from a 
British statute similar to the Act. Looking at the standards for 
imposition of other types of injunctions under the securities laws, 
and taking into account current criminological knowledge con-
cerning white-collar recidivism, Professor Barnard concludes by 
establishing a seven-factor test to define "substantial unfitness" 
under the Act. 
In October 1990 President Bush signed into law the Securities En-
forcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies 
Act). 1 The Remedies Act provides that, in an enforcement action by the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), upon finding 
that a defendant has violated either section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act 
of 19332 or section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 a fed-
eral court may, in addition to ordering monetary sanctions or injunctive 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College ofWilliam 
& Mary. B.S., 1970, University of Illinois; J.D., 1975, University of Chicago. My thanks go to 
Cliff Corker, Joe English, Mike DeBaecke, and Lisa Nicholson, all members of the William & 
Mary Law School Class of 1993, and to Paul Marcus, Mike Gottfredson, Stanton Wheeler, 
David Weisburd, Henry Pontell, Susan Grover, and John Tucker, for sharing their ideas with 
me. 
1. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended in Sl'.,attered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.S.). 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1988). 
3. 15 u.s.c. § 78j(b) (1988). 
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relief, enter an order temporarily suspending or permanently barring the 
defendant from serving as an officer or director of any public company. 
This extraordinary executive disqualification provision codifies the long-
standing SEC practice of seeking such orders even in the absence of stat-
utory authorization.4 With the Remedies Act now in place, executive 
suspension or bar orders (Remedies Act orders) are unquestionably legit-
imate remedies, at least when the requirements of the Act are satisfied. 
What is unclear, however, is what those requirements may-or should-
include. 
The statutory standard courts are to apply in determining whether 
to enter a Remedies Act order is whether the SEC has shown that the 
defendant is "substantial[ly] unfit[] to serve as [a corporate] officer or 
director.''5 The Remedies Act does not define "substantial unfitness," 
and the legislative history of the Act provides little guidance as to what 
Congress may have intended by the phrase. 6 Moreover, SEC enforce-
ment officials have been reluctant to speculate on how they are likely to 
interpret this standard7 and only recently have begun to explore its appli-
cation. 8 Thus, corporate executives are understandably uncertain about 
4. See Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disen· 
franchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32, 38-41 
(1989). 
5. The section reads in full: 
In any proceeding [under the applicable enabling subsection] the court may pro-
hibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as 
it shall determine, any person who violated [the applicable penal provision] from 
acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered 
pursuant to section [12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to 
file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of such Act] if the person's conduct demon-
strates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer. 
15 U.S.C.S. § 77t(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991); see id § 78u(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). 
6. See infra text accompanying note 28. 
7. See, e.g., Focus: Courts' Power to Bar Service as Officer or Director, No Longer Contro-
versial, Still May Raise Difficult Issues, BNA CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Nov. 21, 1990, at 7, 8 
(reporting that Bruce A. Hiler, Associate Director, SEC Enforcement Division, refuses to pre-
dict the kinds of cases in which the staff will seek suspension and bar orders but cautions that 
"there will be appropriate cases"). 
8. The SEC first announced its intention to seek a bar order under the Remedies Act in 
March 1991. See David D. Sterns, Litig. Release No. 12,802, 1991 SEC LEXIS 502, at *3, 
1991 WL 296465 (S.E.C.) at 0 4 (Mar. 11, 1991) (announcing lawsuit against defendant Stems 
and others, seeking "the maximum penalties available pursuant to the Securities Enforcement 
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 and a bar against serving as an officer or 
director of any publicly-held company"). Since then, the SEC has announced its intention to 
seek bar orders in several other cases. See Charles Keating Ill, Litig. Release No. 13,118, [6 
Topical Law] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 73,813, at 63,026, 63,029 (Dec. 12, 1991); Robert D. 
Sparrow, Litig. Release No. 13,011, [1987-1991 Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Releases 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 73,792, at 63,379-14, 63,379-14 (Sept. 30, 1991); 
John R. Ward, Litig. Release No. 12,993, [1987-1991 Accounting & Auditing Enforcement 
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what "substantial unfitness" means, or should mean, especially in a soci-
ety that until now has assumed that questions of executive fitness are 
exclusively in the domain of the market. 
Typically, executives assembling a management team take into ac-
count subjective factors, including a candidate's general and specific busi-
ness expertise, her ability to complement other available management 
skills, compatibility with the organizational culture, and often such inde-
finable characteristics as "synergy" and "sizzle." The choices required in 
selecting top-level managers are usually complex9 and always idiosyn-
cratic to a given organization. 10 
The task of executive selection is complicated by its inevitable un-
certainties. A particular candidate's "fitness to serve" may not always be 
evident. For example, personal rectitude and proven leadership skills in 
a nonbusiness context are not always useful predictors of managerial suc-
cess. 11 By the same token, significant character flaws and even prior un-
lawful conduct do not always signal an inability to lead effectively.12 
Given these uncertainties, one could fairly argue that, like other matters 
Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1!73,788, at 63,379-8, 63,379-8 to 63,379-9 
(Sept. 26, 1991). The Commission already has settled two cases under the new provision. See 
Robert Levin, Litig. Release No. 13,180, 1992 SEC LEXIS 596, at *2, 1992 WL 45945 
(S.E.C.) at *1-*2 (Mar. 3, 1992) (prohibiting defendant from serving as officer or director of 
any public company for 10 years); Delta Rental Sys., Inc., Litig. Release No. 13,073, [6 Topi-
cal Law] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 73,805, at 63,014, 63,014 (Oct. 29, 1991) (permanently 
enjoining defendant CEO from acting as an officer or director of any public company). 
9. The SEC has long recognized the complexity involved in selecting corporate execu-
tives. In In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964), the late Commission Chairman William 
Cary conceded that "[m]anagerial talent consists of personal attributes, essentially subjective 
in nature, that frequently defy meaningful analysis .... The integrity of management-its 
willingness to place its duty to public shareholders over personal interest-is an equally elusive 
factor." Id. at 170. 
10. See CHARLES ANDERSON & ROBERT ANTHONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIREC-
TORS-INSIGHTS FOR BOARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES 89 (1986) (noting that regional 
banks, for example, require very different directoral skills from those required by defense con-
tractors or fashion retailers). 
11. See, e.g., JAMES RESTON, JR., THE LoNE STAR: THE LIFE OF JOHN CONNALLY 588-
610 (1989) (describing the financial collapse of the business empire of John Connally, former 
Governor of Texas and Secretary of the Treasury); Dean Foust et al., AI Haig: Embattled in 
the Boardroom, Bus. WK., June 17, 1991, at 108, 108 (noting that former Secretary of State's 
international reputation and expertise did not save two companies on whose boards he served 
from seeking protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code); Kevin Kelly, The Educa-
tion of Bobby Inman, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1989, at 50, 50 (reporting that former Navy admiral 
and deputy director of the CIA failed as CEO of defense contractor Tracor, Inc.). 
12. A number of business executives have led strong companies and created new share-
holder wealth after an initial run-in with the law. See Dyan Machan & Graham Button, Be-
yond the Slammer, FORBES, Nov. 26, 1990, at 284, 284-86 (recounting the comebacks of 
Albert Nipon (jailed for income tax evasion), Peter Brant (convicted of insider trading), David 
Begelman (convicted of embezzlement), and Paul Thayer (convicted of insider trading)). For a 
broader discussion of the relationship between character and leadership, see THOMAS REEVES, 
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of business judgment, determining whether a candidate is fit to serve as a 
high-level corporate manager is a task singularly unsuited to federal 
court judges. 13 Indeed, executive selection involves the sort of risk-based 
analyses that courts typically try to avoid. 14 Yet, with the enactment of 
the Remedies Act, Congress has indicated (1) that substantial unfitness 
(and therefore presumably its converse, "substantial fitness") for high 
corporate office must be capable of objective definition and (2) that fed-
eral courts are appropriate participants in the crafting of that definition. 
Because the federal courts will inevitably have to undertake this task 
and apply the Remedies Act to defendants appearing before them, it is 
time to consider how judges might approach the substantial-unfitness 
question. There are several possible starting points. Judges often must 
measure the fitness of corporate executives in contexts not involving the 
Remedies Act: cases involving removal from corporate office for cause, 15 
cases involving omissions from proxy statements of material information 
bearing on managerial competence and integrity, 16 and cases involving 
professional disqualification.17 This Article explores the advantages-
and shortcomings-of the methods the courts have used in these situa-
tions to conduct the substantial-unfitness inquiry. It then examines the 
experience of litigants under a statute with language and purposes similar 
to the Remedies Act-the British Company Directors Disqualification 
Act of 198618-to see if it may provide additional direction. The Article 
concludes that none of these models offers sufficient guidance for deter-
mining whether and when an American executive is substantially unfit to 
hold high corporate office. It then proposes a seven-part test to aid fed-
eral courts in making that determination. The test requires a court to 
examine (1) the magnitude, or "egregiousness," of the underlying viola-
tion; (2) the defendant's previous violations of the securities laws, if any, 
A QUESTION OF CHARACTER: A LIFE OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 413-21 (1991) (assessing the 
effect of Kennedy's personal values on his ability to lead the country). 
13. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Atten-
tion: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1482, 1483, 1491 (1984) (noting that business 
decisionmaking seldom involves the type of linear thinking familiar to lawyers and judges). 
14. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 6-7 & nn.20-22 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining 
that corporate executives have specialized expertise, which judges do not share, in dealing with 
business risks); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (plural-
ity opinion) (" '[C]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business 
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.' " (quoting 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978))). 
15. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
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and any other breaches of fiduciary duty as a corporate officer or direc-
tor; (3) the role of the defendant in the underlying securities-law viola-
tion; (4) the degree of the defendant's scienter in connection with the 
violation; (5) the defendant's personal gain, if any, from the underlying 
violation; (6) the likelihood of renewed misconduct; and (7) the defend-
ant's appreciation of the duties of a corporate executive. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE REMEDIES AcT 
The Remedies Act traces its origins to the 1987 report of the Na-
tional Commission on Fraudulent Reporting (Treadway Commission), 19 
which recommended, among many other items, that "the SEC ... seek 
[congressional] authority to bar or suspend corporate officers and direc-
tors involved in fraudulent financial reporting from future service in that 
capacity in a public company."2° Following this recommendation, the 
SEC initiated discussions with congressional officials early in 1988. 
In February 1989 Representative John Dingell introduced theSe-
curities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989,21 which sought to im-
plement the Treadway Commission's recommendations. The proposed 
statute authorized federal courts to impose executive suspension and bar 
orders on defendants found to have violated any provision of the federal 
securities laws.Z2 It also authorized the SEC to enter executive suspen-
sion and bar orders in administrative proceedings brought under section 
15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act.Z3 
As originally introduced, the Remedies Act contained no standard 
by which courts were to determine whether to impose an executive sus-
pension or bar order.24 This omission, and other problems with the bill, 
led the American Bar Association (ABA), through its Section on Busi-
ness Law, to oppose passage of the bill.25 After Richard Breeden became 
19. James Treadway, Jr., a former commissioner of the SEC, chaired the commission. See 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1 
(1987). 
20. I d. at 66. Seven years earlier, criminologists Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager had 
recommended more generally that "[m]anagement officials convicted of criminally violating 
corporate responsibilities be prohibited from assuming similar management positions within 
the corporation or in another corporation for a three-year period." MARSHALL B. CLINARD & 
PETER C. YEAGER, CoRPORATE CRIME 318 (1980). 
21. H.R. 975, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
22. Id. §§ 101, 202. 
23. Id. § 201. 
24. See Barnard, supra note 4, at 60. 
25. See Securities Laws Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 975, 101st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 127-32 (19~9) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of attorney Richard Phillips); Let-
ter from Jean Allard, Section Chair, American Bar Association Section on Business Law, to 
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SEC chairman in October 1989, the Commission proposed amendments 
to the original bill that were designed to address some of the critics' con-
cerns. The amended bill narrowed the suspension and bar provisions by 
deleting the SEC's authority to impose executive suspension or bar or-
ders on its own and by limiting the bill's application in litigated matters 
to instances of "scienter-based fraud."26 The Commission's proposed 
amendments, however, made no mention of "substantial unfitness" or 
any other standard for federal courts to rely on in determining when to 
impose a suspension or bar order. 
After hearing arguments from the ABA and others that the SEC 
should have to show at least some nexus between the defendant's imme-
diate misconduct and the need for a suspension or bar order, and that 
some kind of unfitness standard was necessary to ensure fairness in the 
application of the Remedies Act,27 both the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce added a "substantial unfitness" provision to the bill dur-
ing markup.28 But the committees never discussed in recorded session 
the meaning of substantial unfitness. 
The policy behind the Remedies Act is simple: barring a defendant 
from future service as a corporate officer or director is an expeditious 
mechanism, short of incarceration, for removing him from the tempta-
tion and the likelihood of renewed misconduct.29 Like other forms of 
professional disqualification, Remedies Act orders serve the remedial 
goal of incapacitation. Incapacitation is thought to be a highly effective 
means of controlling business-centered misconduct. 30 
The suspension and bar provisions of the Remedies Act serve other 
remedial goals as well. A Remedies Act order functions not only as a 
the Hon. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 11-24 (May 18, 1990) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
26. The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 647, 
lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Richard C. 
Breeden). The SEC's revised version of S. 647 was submitted to the Senate on February 9, 
1990. 
27. See Barnard, supra note 4, at 60-61; Letter from Jean Allard, supra note 25, at 69-71. 
28. See S. REP. No. 337, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 616, lOlst 
Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1395-96. 
29. As I have noted before, one of the advantages of the Remedies Act over criminal 
prosecution is that in criminal cases the SEC must cede authority to the Department of Justice. 
In civil cases, such as those to which the Remedies Act applies, prosecutorial discretion re-
mains with the Commission. Barnard, supra note 4, at 77. Another obvious attraction is the 
lower burden of proof required to prove wrongdoing. 
30. John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 
28 CRIME & DELINQ. 292, 305-08 (1982). 
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specific deterrent to the defendant, but also as a general deterrent to 
others within her organization and in the business community.31 Be-
cause it impairs the defendant's future employment opportunities, it 
serves as a monetary penalty, even for those defendants who, for 
whatever reasons, have no present ability to pay a substantial fine. 32 "It 
also presents a means of extracting a fine in those instances where corpo-
rate indemnification would reimburse executives for judicially-imposed 
fines."33 
II. SOURCES OF STANDARDS FOR EXECUTIVE UNFITNESS 
Courts have often faced issues similar to those raised by the substan-
tial-unfitness provision of the Remedies Act. In each of the following 
four scenarios, courts have been asked to consider-either explicitly or 
implicitly-whether the defendant's conduct rendered him unfit to serve 
in a significant position of trust and confidence. 
A. The Removal-from-Office-for-Cause Cases 
In the comparatively rare lawsuits in which corporate officers or di-
rectors have challenged their removal from office, 34 courts have entered 
implicit findings of unfitness to serve when corporations have presented 
evidence of the executives' malfeasance or misconduct in office, inflexible 
discord on major policy issues, disobedience of board directives, harass-
ment and uncooperativeness in the transaction of corporate business, 
misapplication of funds, neglect, or incompetence. 35 Other grounds for 
31. Martin F. McDermott, Comment, Occupational Disqualification of Corporate Execu-
tives: An Innovative Condition of Probation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 616-17 
(1982). 
32. Id. at 616. 
33. Id. 
34. High-level corporate managers are typically terminable at will, subject only to the 
liquidated-damages provisions of their contracts. See Julia F. Siler, Bob Schoe//horn Is Refus-
ing to Go Quietly, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 1990, at 34, 34 (recounting astonishment in the business 
community when the long-time CEO of Abbott Laboratories sued Abbott's directors for mis-
conduct in connection with their decision to fire him). 
35. E.g., NAACP of Houston Metro. Council v. NAACP, 460 F. Supp. 583, 586 (S.D. 
Tex. 1978) (holding that board could remove local executive secretary who failed to develop 
organization's membership, behaved in a "dictatorial" fashion, and was responsible for certain 
"irregular financial transactions"); Central Alaska Broadcasting, Inc. v. Bracale, 637 P.2d 711, 
713 (Alaska 1981) (holding that board could discharge station general manager who refused to 
fire an employee at the board's direction); Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal. 
App. 2d 227, 232, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963) (holding that board could remove chairman 
who had mismanaged a major project); Ross v. 311 North Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill. 
App. 2d 336, 343, 264 N.E.2d 406, 410 (1970) (holding that minority shareholders could re-
move officers who loaned corporate funds without adequate security to another corporation 
they controlled, rather than paying a dividend); Morton v. E-Z Rake, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 609, 
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removal, such as conduct disabling the corporation from receiving licen-
sure, 36 entering into a competitive business, 37 or mental incapacitation, 38 
may also exist. 
Of these, however, only certain grounds for removal, such as incom-
petence or physical or mental incapacitation, seem sufficient to support a 
finding of unfitness to serve as an officer or director in any corporation. 
Other grounds for removal, such as interpersonal discord or insubordina-
tion, are often firm-specific and therefore may not be conclusive on the 
issue of substantial unfitness to serve in public companies marketwide. 
Still other grounds for removal, such as neglect of duty or usurpa-
tion of corporate opportunity, may also be firm-specific and thus may not 
be helpful in resolving the substantial-unfitness question. That is, a di-
rector's failure to attend meetings or contribute constructively to the 
governance of a particular company where meetings have been hastily 
scheduled or are geographically inconvenient may not indicate a likeli-
hood of negligence in other venues. Seizure by a director of a corporate 
opportunity in a particular market sector may warrant removal from the 
aggrieved company's board, not to mention the imposition of monetary 
damages, but may not warrant disqualification from leadership opportu-
nities in other market sectors. This may be true especially when the de-
fendant's behavior has occurred in a nonpublic company, in which 
controls are less formal and investors' expectations are less well-defined 
than in public companies. 39 
612-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that board could discharge executive vice president who 
failed to obey a direct order to pay certain claims); Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147 
Mont. 1, 12-13, 409 P.2d 813, 820 (1966) (holding that board could remove director who 
threatened to sue shareholders and "walked out" of meetings called to permit him to explain 
corporate plans); Grace v. Grace Inst., 19 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 226 N.E.2d 531, 534, 279 
N.Y.S.2d 721, 726 (1967) (holding that board could remove one of its members who had 
engaged in repeated and unsuccessful litigation against the corporation); John v. John, 153 
Wis. 2d 343, 346, 450 N.W.2d 795, 798 (1989) (holding that officer/director may be removed 
upon showing of "gross misconduct," "lying to the board of directors, .•. deception and 
disobedience of the board of directors, waste, and mismanagement"). 
36. Cf Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding 
that shareholders could reasonably conclude that CEO who had been convicted of bribery in 
the solicitation of cable franchises should be removed, lest other communities "have some 
reticence in dealing with" the company or "be tempted by knowledge of the conviction to exert 
extortionate pressures" on the company). 
37. E.g., Eckhaus v. Ma, 635 F. Supp. 873, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that discharged 
officer could be removed from the board for cause because he had undertaken employment 
with corporation's competitor); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 691, 695, 469 
P.2d 583, 586 (1970) (holding that board could remove president who misappropriated com· 
pany's equipment and employees to run a competing business). 
38. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 302 (West 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.58(B)(1) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
39. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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In short, given that most removal-from-office-for-cause cases arise 
out of power struggles in closely held companies and also that they often 
involve firm-specific conduct, these cases do not, standing alone, provide 
adequate guidance for determining whether a defendant is substantially 
unfit to serve as an officer or director of any public company. In other 
words, behavior that would constitute grounds for removal from office 
for cause may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, basis for entry of a 
Remedies Act order. 
B. The Proxy Nondisclosure Cases 
Another possible source of authority in interpreting the substantial-
unfitness provision of the Remedies Act is the line of federal proxy regu-
lation cases in which directoral candidates and senior executives have 
withheld from shareholders material information that might bear on 
their competence and integrity and, by logical inference, their fitness to 
serve.40 Courts in these cases have found the pendency of multiple law-
suits against directoral candidates,41 the existence of significant conflicts 
of interest on the part of directoral candidates or their agents, 42 and a 
candidate's substantial criminal record43 all to be material on the issue of 
40. See generally Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Manage-
ment Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 555, 565-605 (1981) (describing case law). 
Currently, proxy statements must include disclosure of certain "events" of the preceding five 
years that are material to an evaluation of the competency or integrity of any director, direc-
tor-nominee, or executive officer. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(t) (1991). These events include busi-
ness bankruptcies, criminal convictions, entry of orders enjoining participation in the financial-
services industry or other business practices, and adjudicated violations of the federal securities 
laws. Id. 
41. E.g., Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252, 261 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that failure to 
disclose 10 pending lawsuits stated a claim under SEC Rule 14a-9); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l 
Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 661 (D. Del. 1980) (holding that failure to disclose prior consent decree 
and pending lawsuits alleging securities fraud in connection with other corporations was a 
material omission). 
42. E.g., Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) (holding that company should have disclosed that its investment banker had a clear 
conflict of interest in connection with a pending transaction, inasmuch as it might have had 
"an adverse affect [sic] upon the shareholders' decision on the integrity and fitness of the indi-
vidual defendants to hold office"); see also Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 991 
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that company's failure to disclose in a merger proxy statement that 
director, a lawyer, had served for years as counsel to the other party's executives, was a mate-
rial omission). 
43. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895, 
914 (D. Del. 1973) (holding that, when the unsavory reputation of a directoral candidate was 
likely to impede FCC approval of a transfer of control, failure to disclose a directoral candi-
date's history of bad check charges, a fugitive-from-justice warrant, and a conviction for drunk 
driving was a material omission under Rule 14a-9). 
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managerial competence and integrity.44 
Typically, upon finding that the defendant has withheld information 
of this sort, federal courts have required proxy resolicitation.45 The sug-
gestion is that had the undisclosed facts been disclosed at the outset vot-
ing shareholders might have voted "no" on the candidates because of 
their unacceptable conduct, rather than voting "yes" or, as often occurs, 
throwing their proxy ballots in the wastebasket. 
The proxy nondisclosure cases, however, like the removal-from-of-
fice-for-cause cases, provide imperfect guidance for determining when an 
executive is substantially unfit to serve as an executive in any public com-
pany. Just because an executive's prior conduct might be material to a 
voting shareholder and thus properly discloseable in a proxy statement, 
does not mean that it should be dispositive on the issue of executive fit-
ness. If that were the case, in every lawsuit in which material nondisclo-
sures in proxy statements were proved, federal courts would be 
authorized to substitute their judgment for that of the shareholders and 
either delete candidates' names from the proxies before solicitation or 
remove already-elected directors from office. Obviously, this is not what 
happens. Moreover, dozens of directoral candidates each year volunta-
rily disclose circumstances that one could construe as reflecting nega-
tively on their personal competence and integrity,46 but they are not for 
that reason automatically disqualified from seeking corporate office. 
There is, in addition, the question whether information that is ar-
guably material within the context of a single company or type of com-
pany also is material to shareholders of any public company. For 
example, a directoral candidate's criminal past may be disqualifying 
when it is likely to interfere with licensure, 47 but may not be in an unreg-
44. Directoral candidates are not, however, required to "confess guilt" in proxy state-
ments to uncharged crimes. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986). 
45. E.g., Gladwin v. Medfield Corp., 540 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming 
trial court's order requiring resolicitation and a new election); Kaufman v. Cooper Cos., 719 F. 
Supp. 174, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (voiding all proxies and rescheduling meeting). 
46. See, e.g., REGAL INT'L INC., PROXY SOLICITATION, Aug. 12, 1991, available in 
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *11 (disclosing that director had been indicted on 
money-laundering charges); FIRST CAPITAL CORP., PROXY SOLICITATION, Feb. 16, 1990, 
available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *7 (director had been convicted of failing to 
file an expenditure report in his capacity as a public official, a misdemeanor under local law); 
McFADDIN VENTURES, INC., PROXY SOLICITATION, June 8, 1989, available in LEXIS, Fed· 
sec Library, Proxy File, at *25 (director of merger partner had pled guilty to misdemeanor 
contempt of court); GAF CORP., PROXY SOLICITATION, Jan. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, 
Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *115 (vice chairman had been indicted for conspiracy, stock 
price manipulation, securities fraud, and wire fraud). 
47. E.g., Chris-Craft, 354 F. Supp. at 914 (holding that a criminal record was material 
because it could result in revocation of company's FCC license). 
HeinOnline -- 70 N.C. L. Rev.  1499 1991-1992
1992] FITNESS FOR CORPORATE OFFICE 1499 
ulated industry. A directoral candidate's alleged misconduct within the 
confines of a family-owned business or other nonpublic company may 
not disqualify him (or suggest that he should be disqualified) from serv-
ing as an officer or director of a public company.48 
In short, the proxy nondisclosure cases, while instructive on the 
types of behavior that may evidence substantial unfitness, do not define 
substantial unfitness. Courts would surely overreach were they to find 
that any behavior required by the federal proxy regulations to be dis-
closed in a later-dated proxy statement provides sufficient grounds for 
imposition of a Remedies Act order. 
C. The Professional Disqualification Cases 
Another possible source of authority on the question of substantial 
unfitness is the line of professional disqualification cases involving law-
yers, physicians, and others. Typical professional licensure statutes pro-
vide for license revocation in cases of "illegal conduct," "habitually 
negligent practice," "dishonorable conduct," or "fraudulent or dishonest 
conduct."49 The body of less than entirely satisfying law that has devel-
oped around these statutes demonstrates the uncertainty that often ac-
companies their application. For example, professionals have 
successfully challenged statutes permitting disqualification for "gross 
negligence" and "misconduct" on the grounds that they are void for 
vagueness.50 Other professionals, however, have lost when they argued 
that such disqualifying standards as "unprofessional conduct,"51 "dis-
honorable conduct,"52 or "bad moral character"53 are unconstitutional. 
All of these statutes, however, share a feature not present in the Reme-
dies Act: initial application in whole or in part by peer professionals who 
are assumed to be knowledgeable about the customs and. practices of 
48. E.g., GAF Corp. v. Heyman, 724 F.2d 727, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[Behavior] in-
volving management of a public corporation should be considered more important to voting 
stockholders than [behavior within a family business.]"). 
49. RANDOLPH P. REAVES, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING AND CERTIFICA-
TION 208 (1984). 
50. H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Board of Professional Eng'rs, 113 Idaho 646, 649-51,747 P.2d 
55, 58-60 (1987) (stating that "[d]isciplinary standards cannot be kept secret from the profes-
sionals or the courts" and that "[w]ithout clearly articulated standards as a backdrop against 
which the court can review discipline, the judicial function is reduced to serving as a rubber 
stamp for the [Disciplinary] Board's action"). 
51. Chast~k v. Anderson, 83 Ill. 2d 502, 509, 416 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1981) (holding that 
such terms are "susceptible to common understanding by members of the profession"). 
52. Duncan v. Missouri Bd. for Architects, 744 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing State ex rei. Lentine v. State Bd. of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 234, 65 S.W.2d 943, 949 
(1933); Holmes v. Missouri Dental Bd., 703 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)). 
53. /d. 
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their profession as well as the standards of conduct-often embodied in a 
written code-to which members of their profession are to be held. 
Other than generalized standards of care and loyalty, 54 there are no 
such agreed-upon standards of conduct for corporate officers and direc-
tors, nor any recognized peer-reviewing bodies to construe them. The 
National Association of Corporate Directors, a voluntary membership 
organization, does not "disqualify" from office those applicants who fail 
to meet its membership standards. Neither does the Conference Board, 
the Young Presidents' Organization, or the Business Roundtable. 
Some professional disqualification statutes are straightforward in 
describing the circumstances that give rise to disqualification. Often 
states automatically disqualify professionals found guilty of a felony, for 
example. 5~ There are no such rules, however, for corporate executives. 
Thus, we find corporate boards appointing and reappointing managers 
who have been found guilty of tax evasion, 56 assault, drunk driving, and 
other "personal" crimes, 57 and even forgery and embezzlement from the 
companies they serve in a fiduciary capacity. 58 What differentiates these 
executives from their (disqualified) professional brethren is not their 
moral purity but their ability to generate value for their shareholders. 
Federal disqualification statutes-even those administered by the 
SEC-similarly fail to suggest a workable standard for determining when 
corporate executives are substantially unfit. Registered brokers may 
have their registrations suspended or revoked if they have "willfully vio-
lated" the securities laws and the suspension or revocation is "in the pub-
lic interest."59 In these cases, however, the SEC, not a federal court, 
makes the initial decision to suspend or revoke the defendant's license. 
Like state disciplinary panels for physicians and lawyers, the SEC is be-
lieved to have special expertise in reviewing claims of unfitness among 
54. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac:r § 8.30 (1991). 
55. E.g., N.Y. JuD. LAW§ 90(4) (McKinney 1983) (providing for automatic disbarment 
when an attorney is convicted of a felony). 
56. See, e.g., Phyllis Furman, Albert Nipon's in Basic Black Again-Dress Company Fash-
ions a Turnaround, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Nov. 14, 1988, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, NYBus File (reporting that CEO of Albert Nipon, Inc. returned to company after a 20-
month imprisonment). 
57. See, e.g., PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ, THE FORDS: AN AMERICAN EPIC 
382 (1987) (recounting the well-publicized drunk driving arrest of Henry Ford II while he was 
CEO of Ford Motor Co.). 
58. See, e.g., DAVID McCLINTICK, INDECENT EXPOSURE: A TRUE STORY OF 
HOLLYWOOD AND WALL STREET 311-25 (1982) (recounting the story of David Begelman, 
who was reinstated as president of Columbia Pictures, Inc. following disclosure that he had 
embezzled tens of thousands of dollars from the company). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988). A similar standard applies to mutual fund managers 
and investment advisers. See id. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(e). 
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financial professionals60 and to appreciate the special "public interest" 
needs present in the financial markets.61 No one would suggest that fed-
eral courts share this special expertise or indeed that anyone has special 
expertise with respect to the issue of corporate executives' fitness to serve. 
The inability to define managerial fitness with precision may explain in 
part why so many boards have fired their CEOs in recent months62 or 
why so many substantial and respectable public companies have found 
themselves filing for protection under the bankruptcy statutes. 63 
In short, the professional disqualification cases are of little direct use 
in deciding who is substantially unfit to serve as a corporate officer or 
director. Indeed, risk-prone behavior unsuited to a nonexecutive profes-
sional may be precisely the sort of behavior investors seek when their 
company is facing new market challenges. 
D. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 
Another possible source of authority that appears at first glance to 
be quite directly on point is a line of English cases decided under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, which permits courts 
in the United Kingdom to suspend or bar corporate executives whom 
they find to be "unfit to be concerned in the management of a com-
pany."64 Under a predecessor to this statute the late Robert Maxwell, as 
60. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 598 (2d Cir. 1969). 
61. The "public interest" standard has withstood challenges that it is void for vagueness, 
in part because courts have found that the SEC is singularly well situated to determine what 
the public interest requires. See Dirks v. SEC, 802 F.2d 1468, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
62. See Jim Bartinto & Karen Blumenthal, Compaq's Canion is Unexpected Casualty of 
the Brutal Personal-Computer Wars, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at B1; Joann S. Lublin, More 
Chief Executives Are Being Forced Out by Tougher Boards, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1991, at A1; 
Amal K. Naj, Hennessy Is Retiring at Allied-Signal Inc., Sooner Than Expected, WALL ST. J., 
June 27, 1991, at Al. 
63. These companies include, for example, Greyhound, Eastern Airlines, TWA, South-
land Corp., Revco Drugs, Federated Department Stores, Allied Stores, Macy's, Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert, and Circle K. Amanda Bennett & Joann S. Lublin, Increasing Turnover at the 
Top Sends Many Executives' Careers into Limbo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at B1. 
64. 7(2) HAI.sBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 2113 (4th ed. Reissue 1988). The act in 
full provides: 
The court must make a disqualification order against a person in any case where, on 
an application for this purpose, the court is satisfied (1) that he is or has been a 
director of a company which has at any time become insolvent, whether while he was 
a director or subsequently, and (2) that his conduct as a director of that company, 
either taken alone or taken together with his conduct as a director of any other com-
pany or other companies, makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
company. 
The minimum period of disqualification which may be imposed under these pro-
visions is two years, and the maximum period which may be imposed is 15 years. 
/d. (footnotes omitted). 
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a result of the failure of his Pergamon Press, was found in 1971 to be "a 
person who [cannot] be relied on to exercise proper stewardship of a pub-
licly quoted company."65 
The Disqualification Act is enforced by the British Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), which receives referrals from receivers in 
insolvency proceedings. In 1989 DTI authorized court action in 440 of 
the 3,234 disqualification referrals it received. 66 British courts disquali-
fied 303 directors that year, causing some observers to lament that an 
increasing number of unfit directors was escaping the public's notice. 67 
Applying the "unfit to be concerned in the management of a com-
pany" standard, British courts have found unfitness in cases in which the 
defendant traded consecutively through several insolvent companies that 
had failed to pay their corporate tax obligations;68 in which the defend-
ant traded simultaneously through several insolvent companies, one of 
which was undercapitalized from the beginning, and paid himself exces-
sive compensation, rendering the companies unable to pay their corpo-
rate taxes;69 and in which the defendant was the sole director of four 
companies, all of which were undercapitalized from the beginning, none 
of which filed timely financial reports, and all of which became insolvent 
within a five-year period, leaving their corporate taxes unpaid. 7° Courts 
have disqualified directors whose involvement in a company's failure has 
been no more than "peripheral,'m and even directors who personally lost 
substantial funds as a result of the failure. 72 Courts considering disquali-
fication orders may review only the conduct that gave rise to the underly-
ing insolvency, and may not consider extrinsic evidence of other business 
65. Peter J. Boyer, Maxwell's Silver Hammer, V ANlTY FAIR, June 1991, at 112, 180. 
Maxwell's alleged looting 20 years later of the pension funds at Mirror Group and of corporate 
funds at Maxwell Communication, Inc. suggests that the Pergamon disqualification order was 
both valid and prescient. See, e.g., Nicholas Bray, Securities Lending in UK Dealt Blow by 
Maxwell Affair, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1991, at AlO. 
66. Receivers Act, DAlLY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 15, 1990, at 27. 
67. Roland Gribben, Reforms Fail to Weed out the 'Rogues,' DAlLY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Sept. 24, 1990, at 27. 
68. In re Lo-Line Elec. Motors Ltd., [1988] I Ch. 477, 491. 
69. In re Stanford Servs. Ltd., [1987] BCLC 607, 613. 
70. In re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd., [1988] BCLC 341. "To reach a finding of 
unfitness the court must be satisfied that the director has been guilty of a serious failure or 
serious failures, whether deliberately or through incompetence, to perform those duties of a 
director which are attendant on the privilege of trading through companies with limited liabil-
ity." 7(2) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 2114 n.3 (4th ed. Reissue 1988). Miscon• 
duct in any capacity other than that of a director may be disregarded. Lo-Line, [1988] I Ch. at 
485. 
71. In re Majestic Recording Studios Ltd., [1989] BCLC 1, 5-6. 
72. In re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd., [1991) Ch. 164, 179-80. 
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misconduct. 73 
The problem with using these cases as a model to determine sub-
stantial unfitness under the Remedies Act is that the Disqualification Act 
is triggered by corporate insolvency, not by managerial misconduct that 
may fall short of business failure, and is largely a feature of British na-
tional revenue policy rather than of any policy relating to the protection 
of investors. That is, the Disqualification Act exists primarily to deter 
corporate managers from failing to honor their tax obligations to the 
Crown, not to deter them from failing to make required financial disclo-
sures to investors under the applicable securities laws. This singular fo-
cus of the Disqualification Act and the fact-specific, small-company 
context in which most of the recent disqualification cases have been de-
cided severely limit the utility of these cases in construing the substantial-
unfitness standard contained in the Remedies Act. 
III. A PRELIMINARY PRESCRIPTION FOR APPLYING THE 
SUBSTANTIAL-UNFITNESS PROVISION OF THE REMEDIES 
Acr 
How, then, should federal courts approach the substantial-unfitness 
question? A simple answer is that they should do so with great forbear-
ance. At a minimum, the power to bar someone from significant oppor-
tunities for employment should require proof by clear and convincing 
evidence that such a sanction is necessary.74 And even assuming the 
73. /d. at 177 (holding that period of disqualification should be based solely upon evidence 
submitted in connection with a specific insolvency). 
74. See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring that evidence of 
need to suspend broker's license be clear and convincing); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 
294 (Fla. 1987) (requiring that evidence of need to revoke teacher's license be clear and con-
vincing). The law has long recognized that assertions of unfitness for employment carry seri-
ous consequences for the subject. For example, such assertions, if false, constitute defamation 
per se, excusing the plaintiff from pleading or proving special damages. See Abbott v. United 
Venture Capital, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Nev. 1988) (holding libelous per se the publi-
cation of allegations, later withdrawn, that a lawyer engaged in multiple securities violations). 
In this sense, allegations of unfitness are much like allegations of common-law fraud, which, 
because of the stigma they impose on the defendant, must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 
285 n.18 (1966). In contrast, the standard of proof on the issue whether the defendant violated 
the underlying antifraud statute is only a preponderance of the evidence. See Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-91 (1983) (requiring lower court to apply prepon-
derance-of-the-evidence standard in a private action for violation of Rule 10b-5); Steadman v. 
SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981) (requiring proof that investment adviser violated antifraud provi-
sions to meet only the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (requiring lower court to apply preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard in SEC injunctive action for violation of§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act). 
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standard of proof is high, one must also consider what sorts of evidence 
might be probative on the issue of substantial unfitness to serve. 
A. What Conduct Should Be Considered? 
An initial question is whether the "conduct" of the defendant that 
the court must review to reach its determination on the substantial-unfit-
ness question should be limited to that shown by the SEC in connection 
with the underlying securities law violation, or whether that conduct 
may also encompass other activities preceding and postdating the viola-
tion. This question-whether the court in the "remedies phase" of the 
trial should consider evidence extrinsic to that adduced in the "merits 
phase" -is familiar to criminal defense lawyers. In the sentencing phase 
of criminal cases, prosecutors often present extrinsic evidence of "other 
crimes" and the defendant may challenge that evidence in a so-called 
Fatico hearing, 75 as occurred, for example, in Michael Milken's case 
before Judge K.imba Wood in October 1990.76 
1. Extrinsic Evidence of Misconduct 
The SEC undoubtedly will argue that extrinsic evidence is fair game 
for the court in determining whether a defendant is substantially unfit to 
serve as an officer or director of a public company. Mter all, a primary 
purpose of the Remedies Act is to create new enforcement options for 
dealing with repeat violators of the securities laws. 77 If the court were 
limited to the evidence submitted in support of the government's case in 
chief, only those defendants found to have participated in a single "egre-
gious" fraud would be subject to a suspension or bar order, 78 while recid-
ivists who engage in sequential, smaller frauds would remain free to 
abuse their management positions again and again. 
There is, however, another way to view the issue whether a court 
should consider extrinsic evidence in addressing the substantial-unfitness 
75. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711-14 (2d Cir. 1978). 
76. Kurt Eichenwald, Final Chapter in Milken Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1990, at D1, 
D6. 
77. See infra text accompanying note 115. 
78. "For example, a corporate officer who perpetrates a financial fraud on the scale of the 
Equity Funding case, having been brought to justice, should not be permitted to regain a posi-
tion of corporate control." Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 30 (statement of Richard C. 
Breeden). Equity Funding involved a decade-long two-billion dollar insurance fraud scheme in 
which corporate employees falsified thousands of records in order to create the appearance of a 
successful enterprise; the ultimate loss to investors was estimated at tens of millions of dollars. 
See RAYMOND L. DIRKS & LEONARD GROSS, THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL 11 
(1974); RONALD L. SOBLE & ROBERT E. DALLOS, THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE EQUITY 
FUNDING STORY 278 (1975). 
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question. The justification for admitting extrinsic evidence during the 
sentencing phase of a criminal case is that a court's responsibility for 
sentencing historically has implicated broader considerations than those 
applicable to the finding of guilt or innocence.79 These considerations 
include a societal interest in retribution and deterrence. Courts also have 
recognized a need to individualize sentences-to tailor them to the de-
fendant as well as to the crime-and this view often has been cited to 
justify relaxing the rules of evidence and permitting broad-ranging in-
quiry into every aspect of the defendant's life. 80 These considerations 
need not apply in civil cases and, indeed, may be entirely inappropriate, 
given that the purpose of sentencing is to impose punishment and punish-
ment is constitutionally impermissible in civil proceedings. &I 
This latter view, however persuasive, is unlikely to prevail. Given 
the policies underlying the Remedies Act, courts are likely to adopt the 
government's view and liberally entertain extrinsic evidence of wrongdo-
ing in the remedies phase of the trial. 82 This is not inappropriate because 
(1) the information is relevant to the inquiry at hand-that is, whether 
the defendant has "a propensity to abuse a position of corporate trust,"83 
and (2) the suspension-or-bar power is available only in SEC enforce-
ment proceedings and not in private damages actions. 84 Thus, the pub-
lic-interest considerations relevant to the entry of a suspension or bar 
order are similar to those attendant to the imposition of a criminal sen-
tence, 85 and warrant a broad inquiry into the defendant's overall 
behavior. 
79. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("A sentencing judge, however, is 
not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional 
limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been 
determined."). 
80. Id. 
81. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963); see also Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (stating that injunctive relief is "designed to deter, not to 
punish"). 
82. See, e.g., SEC v. Thomasson Panhandle Co., 145 F.2d 408, 411 (lOth Cir. 1944) (ap-
proving admission of evidence of scheme post-dating allegations in underlying cause of action 
"for the purpose of proving the allegation of the complaint that the defendant[] would con-
tinue to engage in the acts and practices set forth in the complaint"); SEC v. Everest Manage-
ment Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (considering defendant's conduct in an 
entirely unrelated matter, "insofar as it reflect[ed] [the defendant's] pronounced tendency to 
operate outside the recognized bounds of his profession and the law"). 
83. Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 30 (statement of Richard C. Breeden). 
84. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77t (Law. Co-op. 1991); id. § 78u-1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). 
85. See 1 MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL 
& STATE ENFORCEMENT§ 5.03 (1991). 
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2. Hearsay Allegations 
Assuming extrinsic evidence is admissible on the substantial-unfit-
ness question, another, more troublesome, question now arises. In crimi-
nal cases, the court during the sentencing phase may consider not only 
extrinsic evidence but also hearsay evidence. 86 Thus, courts have enter-
tained hearsay references to the defendant's prior unindicted crimes, 87 
affiliations with organized crime, 88 and unsubstantiated acts of mayhem89 
as part of the sentencing equation. This practice has been justified on the 
grounds that no jury is involved and that the sentencing inquiry is not a 
"fact finding" inquiry but a predictive one, thus permitting a more flexi-
ble application of the rules of evidence. 
The practice of considering hearsay evidence, however, should not 
extend to cases in which the SEC seeks entry of a Remedies Act order, 
for two reasons. First, Congress has not indicated, as it has in the case of 
criminal sentencing,90 its approval of such a practice. Second, civil en-
forcement actions seldom will require the court to consider anonymous 
allegations by government informants, as may occur in criminal cases. 
Federal courts hearing cases brought under the Remedies Act should not 
be permitted to consider hearsay testimony-on the issue of substantial 
unfitness or otherwise--except as the Federal Rules of Evidence ex-
pressly, and narrowly, permit.91 
3. The Range of Wrongs to Be Considered 
Assuming the court entertains evidence of managerial misconduct 
86. Not all of the strict procedural safeguards and evidentiary limitations of a criminal 
trial are required at sentencing. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 250 (1949). A trial 
judge making a sentencing determination may "appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in 
scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source 
from which it may come." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). 
87. E.g., United States v. Bonnet, 769 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding district 
court's consideration of presentence report, which included allegation that defendant had been 
involved in a scheme to exchange stolen cars for narcotics, even though government conceded 
it had no witnesses who could testify to this). 
88. United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.) (upholding district court's 
consideration of testimony of government witnesses who recounted allegations by six confiden-
tial informants that defendant "was associated with a known crime family figure as a trusted 
associate and collector for him"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985). 
89. E.g., United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding district 
court's consideration of hearsay testimony that defendant was drug organization's chief "en-
forcer" and contract killer). 
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concern-
ing the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court 
of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence."). 
91. See f:ED. R. Evm. 801-06. 
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other than that involved in the underlying violation of the securities laws, 
excluding hearsay, yet a third question arises: Should that evidence be 
limited to proof of financial misconduct, or may it include evidence of 
other forms of managerial misconduct, such as violations of the equal 
employment laws or environmental regulations? What conduct is rele-
vant to determining whether an executive is substantially unfit to serve? 
It is conceivable that, in enacting the Remedies Act, Congress intended 
to encourage judicial examination of all aspects of an executive's work, 
including competence, diligence, and command of market share, in addi-
tion to previous violations of the securities laws. It seems unlikely, but 
the legislative history is silent on this issue. A more reasonable interpre-
tation of the statutory language, given its context, would limit the field of 
inquiry to other violations of the federal securities laws, violations of re-
lated state securities laws, and what may loosely be described as "mana-
gerial misconduct," including breaches of fiduciary duties to investors 
and creditors. 
B. The Enforcement Injunction Versus the Remedies Act Order 
Long before the enactment of the Remedies Act, federal courts hear-
ing SEC enforcement actions often entered orders against defendants 
found to have violated the securities laws, requiring them to disgorge 
their ill-gotten profits92 and enjoining them from engaging in specific fu-
ture misconduct.93 The test for entering this second, "obey the law" type 
of injunction is whether, under all the circumstances, "there is a reason-
able likelihood that the wrong will be repeated. "94 
The Remedies Act in no way impairs courts' authority to continue 
to enter these sorts of enforcement injunctions, when the "likelihood of 
92. E.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 
(1985); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 626-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
93. E.g., Materia, 745 F.2d at 201 (enjoining defendant from insider trading); SEC v. 
Champion Sports Management, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 527, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enjoining de-
fendant from future violations of Rule 10b-5); SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1536 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reins. Corp., 734 F.2d 118, 
119 (2d Cir. 1984); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 518 F. Supp. 773, 778 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enjoining defendant from violating registration provisions of the 1933 Act). 
94. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); see also SEC v. 
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he test for injunctive relief is 'whether 
the defendant's past conduct indicates . . . that there is a reasonable likelihood of further 
violation in the future.' "). Recently, some courts have become quite stringent in the level of 
proof they require to support entry of an injunction. See, e.g., SEC v. John Adams Trust 
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Mass. 1988) (SEC must present "positive proof of a realistic 
likelihood that past wrongdoing will recur" and also demonstrate that recurrent violations are 
a "relatively imminent threat" (citing SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 
1977)); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
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recurrence" standard is met.95 Rather, the Remedies Act has given fed-
eral courts a new remedy, but it has conditioned that remedy on a show-
ing ("substantial unfitness") above and beyond the lesser standard 
("likelihood of recurrence") that is required to support an enforcement 
injunction. It is therefore important to emphasize that a defendant who 
may legitimately be subject to an injunction against specific forms of mis-
conduct is not necessarily subject to a suspension or bar order under the 
Remedies Act. That is, it may be appropriate for a court to enjoin spe-
cific future acts, or even to enter a corporation-specific suspension or bar 
order,96 but it may be inappropriate on the same set of facts to conclude 
that the defendant is substantially unfit to serve as an executive of any 
public company. Consider the following example. 
The SEC recently alleged that, during 1986 and 1987, the chief fi-
nancial officer, chief accounting officer, chief operating officer, and chair-
man of the board of Thortec International, Inc. doctored the company's 
financial statements so as to overstate revenue by $8.4 million.97 These 
allegations are similar to those made in one of the SEC's first "test cases" 
under the Remedies Act.98 In settling the Thortec charges, the defend-
ants consented to an injunction prohibiting them from engaging in future 
violations of specified securities laws in any setting.99 In similar cases, 
defendants have agreed to injunctions prohibiting them from serving as 
officers or directors of the specific companies in which their misconduct 
occurred. 100 Some have even consented to comprehensive orders en-
95. See H.R. REP. No. 616, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1395. "The Committee emphasizes that specifying this particular type of 
ancillary relief in the legislation should not be construed as restricting the authority of the 
federal courts to impose any form of equitable relief for a violation of the securities laws." /d. 
"By specifying this particular type of ancillary relief, the section does not restrict the court's 
inherent equitable authority." ld. at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1398. 
96. See Barnard, supra note 4, at 51-53. 
97. Ex-Engineering Execs Settle Charges They Overstated Firm's Revenues, Income, 22 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 849, 849 (June 1, 1990). 
98. See David Sterns, Litig. Release No. 12,802, 1991 SEC LEXIS 502, at *1-3, 1991 WL 
296465 (S.E.C.) at *2-4 (Mar. 11, 1991). 
99. Richard H. Towle, Litig. Release No. 12,484, [1987-1991 Accounting & Auditing En-
forcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 73,727, at 63,289, 63,289, 
63,290 (May 24, 1990) (defendants agreed not to aid or abet violations of§ 13 of the Exchange 
Act, and one defendant, the corporate chief financial officer, agreed not to violate § 17(a)(2) or 
§ 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act). 
100. E.g., Florafax Int'l, Inc., Litig. Release No. 10,617, [1987-1991 Accounting & Audit-
ing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 73,444, at 63,161, 
63,162-63 (Nov. 27, 1984) (CEO agreed to resign and refrain from serving for three years); 
American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., Litig. Release No. 8561, 1978 SEC LEXIS 557, at *1, 
1978 WL 19925 (S.E.C.) at *1-2 (Oct. 11, 1978) (defendant, CEO and director, agreed to 
resign and refrain from serving as officer or director); Penn Cent., Litig. Release No. 8378, 
1978 SEC LEXIS 1723, at *1, 1978 WL 20740 (S.E.C.) at *1 (Apr. 21, 1978) (defendant 
HeinOnline -- 70 N.C. L. Rev.  1509 1991-1992
1992] FITNESS FOR CORPORATE OFFICE 1509 
joining them from serving as an officer or director of any public 
company.101 
Assuming the Thortec defendants had litigated, rather than settled, 
the SEC's complaint, it is entirely possible that a federal judge hearing 
the case would have entered an enforcement injunction identical to that 
agreed to in settlement. This remedy would permit the defendants, on 
pain of contempt were they to violate the injunction's terms, to continue 
working in their existing environment or elsewhere. 
Alternatively, the court could have entered a corporation-specific in-
junction, forcing the defendants to leave the scene of their prior miscon-
duct either temporarily or permanently, 102 but leaving them free to seek 
work as executives in those public companies willing to hire and super-
vise them. 103 In any event, the full force of the Remedies Act "death 
penalty" provision, foreclosing the defendant's most restorative job op-
portunities, might not be required to achieve the Act's stated objective of 
investor protection. 
In pre-Remedies Act cases, federal courts were admonished to tailor 
each injunction so as to "restrain no more than what is reasonably re-
quired to accomplish its ends."104 This same sense of restraint-and a 
rule of thumb counseling courts to apply the least invasive remedy possi-
agreed not to become a director, officer, employee, or consultant to any of the Penn Central 
"complex of companies," presumably for life). 
101. Charles W. Anshen, Litig. Release No. 11,618, 1987 SEC LEXIS 3094, at *1, 1987 
WL 110215 (S.E.C.) at *1-2 (Dec. 2, 1987) (barring defendant from serving as an officer or 
director of a public company for five years); Wallace C. Sparkman, Litig. Release No. 11,532, 
1987 SEC LEXIS 3795, at *2, 1987 WL 113537 (S.E.C.) at *2 (Sept. 3, 1987) (barring defend-
ant from serving as either a director or an officer of a public company for four years); Gulf 
Resources, Inc., Litig. Release 10,291, 1984 SEC LEXIS 2168, at *1, 1984 WL 50519 (S.E.C) 
at *1-2 (Feb. 21, 1984) (prohibiting one defendant from becoming or acting as an officer, direc-
tor, or control person of any public company absent Commission permission); Frederix P. 
DeVeau, Litig. Release No. 9842, 1982 SEC LEXIS 106, at *1, 1982 WL 34335 (S.E.C.) at *1-
2 (Dec. 17, 1982) (barring defendant from associating as an officer, director, control person, or 
consultant to any public companies until he satisfies a disgorgement order and therafter only 
upon notice to the Commission); Jack M. Catain, Jr., Litig. Release No. 9129, 1980 SEC 
LEXIS 1123, at *3, 1980 WL 21849 (S.E.C.) at *3 (July 8, 1980) (barring defendant from 
serving as an officer or director of a public company absent court approval); Sheldon L. Hart, 
Litig. Release No. 9080, 1980 SEC LEXIS 1526, at *1, 1980 WL 26886 (S.E.C.) at *1-2 (May 
9, 1980) (barring defendant from being a director or, under certain circumstances, an officer of 
a public company unless that company bas and maintains an audit committee of the board). 
102. Such an order would be proper as a form of ancillary relief. SEC v. Techni-Culture, 
Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,501, at 95,758, 95,759 (Apr. 2, 
1974). 
103. Remember that under the proxy rules shareholders also would be entitled to know 
about the existence of the injunction, thus raising the likelihood that the defendants' conduct 
would be closely monitored. See supra note 40. 
104. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he 
nature and extent of the relief granted should not exceed that necessary to adequately protect 
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ble-should extend to consideration of executive suspension or bar or-
ders under the Remedies Act. Given the alternative remedies already 
available, federal courts should turn to this extraordinary form of relief 
only as a last resort. 
This is not to say that hard-core securities-law violators should be 
immune from imposition of a Remedies Act order. I merely urge caution 
against the too-easy application of the Act's powerful disqualification 
provision, especially since this type of sanction inherently invites 
overuse. 105 
C. The Substance of the Inquiry 
Bearing in mind the limits on the scope of inquiry discussed 
above, 106 a federal court should consider seven issues before it can feel 
confident in making a finding of substantial unfitness. As a threshold 
question, the court should ask whether the defendant's conduct was 
either "egregious" or "chronic," because these are the only two circum-
stances under which Congress anticipated the Remedies Act order would 
be available. 
1. The "Egregiousness" of the Underlying Violation 
In lobbying for the Remedies Act, both SEC Chairman Richard 
Breeden and his predecessor, David Ruder, assured Congress that the 
Commission would seek executive suspension and bar orders only in 
cases of "egregious" misconduct or of repeated violations of the securi-
ties laws. 107 Inevitably, however, the SEC and defendants will differ 
about what conduct qualifies as "egregious." Thus, federal courts may 
have to adopt at least informal guidelines to determine whether the SEC 
has satisfied this necessary precondition-a showing of misconduct be-
yond mere liability-for initiating the substantial-unfitness inquiry. This 
is not an unfamiliar process. In deciding whether to enter enforcement 
injunctions in pre-Remedies Act cases, courts often looked to the magni-
the public interest."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971); SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 650 
(N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
105. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra part III.A.2. 
107. Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 29-30 (statement of Richard C. Breeden); Hearings 
on a Bill to Amend Federal Securities Laws in Order to Provide Additional Enforcement Reme-
dies for Violation of these Laws: H.R. 975 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and 
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1989) (state-
ment of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC); Hearings on the Recommendations of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, tOOth Cong., 2d Scss. 174 
(1988) (statement of David S. Ruder). 
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tude of the underlying securities law violations. 108 Another analogy fa-
miliar to federal courts is the process of determining whether a 
defendant's conduct, in addition to supporting a finding of liability, has 
been sufficiently willful and wanton to support a judgment for punitive 
damages. 109 
Some indicia of "egregiousness" are predictable. In considering 
whether a defendant is substantially unfit to serve, district courts should 
ask with respect to the SEC's case-in-chief these eight questions: Was the 
loss to investors actual, or only hypothetical?110 What was the amount 
of investors' losses, both in the aggregate and per investor? How many 
investors suffered losses? Did the defendant act alone or did she enlist 
the participation of other, less culpable actors? Did the violation occur 
within the confines of one enterprise, or involve several? Was the defend-
ant's infraction an isolated action or part of a comprehensive and long-
lasting scheme? What was the duration of the scheme? Finally, did the 
violation generate public attention (that is, was it regarded as news-
worthy)? A showing under these guidelines that the defendant's actions 
resulted in substantial harm, both to individual victims and to the securi-
ties markets generally, could fairly bring about a finding that her conduct 
was "egregious." Only then should the court proceed to consider the 
defendant's fitness to serve as a corporate executive in the future. 
In considering the egregiousness issue, federal courts could, but 
need not, refer to the formulas set forth in the federal sentencing guide-
lines for determining the "offense level" of similar behavior in a criminal 
context. The sentencing guidelines categorize fraud-related crimes based 
on such factors as the defendant's premeditation and the amount lost by 
defrauded complainants, 111 and then permit upward or downward ad-
justment based on the defendant's degree of leadership in the fraud, 112 
the nature of the victim(s), 113 and the defendant's acceptance ofresponsi-
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1972) 
("These were not mere 'technical' violations of regulatory legislation, but continual and exten-
sive violations of provisions which lie at the very heart of a remedial statute."). 
109. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNmVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE 
§ 5.03 (1985). 
110. There can be a startling difference between estimated investor losses and "proven" 
losses. See, e.g., J;)ENNIS LEVINE, INSIDE OUT: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF WALL STREET 
416-17 (1991) (noting that while prosecutors argued that Michael Milken's crimes had cost the 
investing public $4-7 million, the trial judge ruled that the total investor loss was $318,082). 
111. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL MANUAL-1992 EDmON § 2Fl.l (1991). 
112. /d. § 3Bl.l (permitting upward adjustment when defendant was the manager, orga-
nizer, supervisor, or leader of the scheme). 
113. /d. § 3Al.l (providing for upward adjustment when the defendant's victim(s) can be 
characterized as "vulnerable"); see, e.g., United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562, 565-66 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (subjecting defendant broker who defrauded investors of over $3.8 million to 100% 
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bility for the offense.U4 Calculating a hypothetical offense level under 
the guidelines could serve as a benchmark in assessing the propriety c;>f 
entering a Remedies Act order. A preferable and less formulaic course 
would require the court to consider "egregiousness" using the mosaic 
process described above. 
2. The Defendant's "Repeat Offender" Status 
An alternative threshold inquiry, when "egregiousness" may not be 
present, is whether the defendant is a repeat, or "chronic," securities-law 
violator. In pre-Remedies Act cases many decisions turned on this issue, 
and the legislative history of the Act suggests it may be a critical factor in 
Remedies Act cases as well. 115 
In the pre-Remedies Act cases, courts asked whether a defendant's 
violation of the law was "isolated" or "recurrent."116 Believing that a 
person who violates the law repeatedly is likely to continue to do so, 117 
courts used evidence of repeat offenses to justify the entry of enforcement 
injunctions. 118 Thus, in cases in which there was no evidence of similar 
misconduct either before or after the violation, courts often found injunc-
tive relief inappropriate.119 When, on the other hand, misconduct had 
occurred repeatedly over a several-year period, courts were more inclined 
to enter enforcement injunctions. 120 The consensus in these cases seemed 
to be that when a defendant's violations of the securities laws were 
"'part of a chronic pattern of violations,' " 121 an injunction might be the 
only appropriate noncriminal response. These same guidelines should 
apply in cases in which a Remedies Act order is under consideration, 
upward adjustment because of the "extent and magnitude of the harm" he caused, especially to 
his elderly and disabled clients). See generally C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated Investors 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1081, 1085-88 (noting disparate judicial 
treatment of defendants in civil cases involving sophisticated investors compared to cases in· 
volving unsophisticated investors). 
114. U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, supra note 111, § 3El.l{a) (permitting downward adjust-
ment when defendant "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of per· 
sonal responsibility for his criminal conduct"). 
115. See S. REP. No. 337, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 21 {1990) ("A permanent bar might be 
appropriate if the violation were particularly egregious or the violator was a recidivist."). 
116. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 
u.s. 834 (1977). 
117. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
118. Traditionally, recidivism "weigh[ed] heavily in favor of [an] injunction." SEC v. 
Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980). 
119. E.g., SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979). 
120. See Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 913. 
121. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 79 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting SEC v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,583, at 94,472 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 28, 1978)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). 
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with the understanding that demonstrated recidivism is merely a thresh-
old question and that the SEC must establish other factors discussed be-
low, to warrant the imposition of a remedy as drastic as an executive 
suspension or bar. 
3. The Role of the Defendant in the Scheme to Defraud 
The Remedies Act limits courts' authority to enter an executive sus-
pension or bar order to violations of the antifraud statutes, section 
17(a)(l) of the Securities Act or section lO(b) of the Exchange Act. 122 
These provisions encompass a wide range of behavior, from insider trad-
ing by corporate executives123 to churning by brokers124 to aiding and 
abetting fraud on investors by accountants, lawyers, and others. 125 Con-
sequently, the first post-threshold question federal courts should consider 
when presented with a substantial-unfitness inquiry is whether the de-
fendant's unlawful conduct occurred while he was acting as an officer or 
director of a public company or whether he was. acting in some nonex-
ecutive capacity. 126 The answer to this question should prov1e significant, 
122. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77t(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991); id. § 78u(d)(2) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991). 
123. E.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,441-42 (9th Cir. 1990) (corporate president secretly 
bought stock of acquisition target before takeover announcement). 
124. E.g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 906 F.2d 1206, 1210 & n.3 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for $100,000 plus $2 million in punitive damages against de-
fendant broker who had churned account by making over 100 unauthorized trades); Nesbit v. 
McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding violation by defendant broker who had 
liquidated some of plaintiff's portfolio and engaged in speculative trading, even though the 
portfolio increased in value). 
125. E.g., Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1012 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding liable as 
aider and abettor a bank that prepared a comfort letter to bond trustee urging disbursement of 
funds to its client without adequate investigation); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 
183-84 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding accounting firm liable as aider and abettor under rule lOb-S 
because one of its partners wrote a misleading tax opinion letter), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 
(1982); SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 65 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding 
liable as aider and abettor a lawyer who participated in a scheme to extend a public offering 
beyond its specified deadline and took no steps to amend the prospectus when the company's 
CEO was indicted for mail fraud), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990). 
126. The legislative history of the Remedies Act confirms the importance of this inquiry: 
The Committee believes that the remedy of a bar or suspension from service as a 
corporate officer or director is especially appropriate in cases in which a defendant 
has engaged in fraudulent conduct while serving in a corporate or other fiduciary 
capacity. Although the express authority to grant this relief is not limited to cases 
involving corporate officers or directors, the legislation would authorize the remedy 
only when the conduct of the defendant demonstrates the defendant's substantial 
unfitness to serve as an officer or director. 
H.R. REP. No. 616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1394. 
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though not dispositive, in determining whether a Remedies Act order is 
appropriate. 
Defendants whose role in the underlying antifraud violation had 
nothing to do with executive status should benefit from a rebuttable pre-
sumption that they are not appropriate subjects for a suspension or bar 
order; those whose executive status facilitated their misconduct should 
be burdened by a presumption that they are at least eligible for such an 
order, assuming other factors, discussed below, are present. Given these 
presumptions, the psychiatrist caught trading on inside information re-
vealed to him by a patient, 127 for example, or the chief executive's wife 
who transmits confidential market information to a relative, 128 would not 
be candidates for a Remedies Act order. By contrast, a chief executive 
who masterminds an elaborate scheme to defraud investors, resulting in 
millions of dollars in losses; 129 one who engages in "massive financial 
fraud" over several years, sells his shares before detection, and then flees 
the country;130 or one vlith a criminal record for fraud who then partici-
pates in misappropriating the proceeds of a public offering131 would seem 
to be precisely the sort of person for whom the harshest provisions of the 
Remedies Act were intended. 
It is, of course, possible that the SEC could overcome a defendant's 
presumption of ineligibility-in other words, that nonexecutive behavior 
could form the basis for a Remedies Act order. For example, a lawyer 
serving as outside counsel who is repeatedly implicated in fraudulent se-
curities schemes involving his corporate clients, 132 an investment banker 
who masterminds a particularly rapacious insider-trading scheme, 133 or 
an auditor who knowingly and deliberately misrepresents corporate 
127. See Insider Trading Psychiatrist Pleads Guilty to Securities Fraud, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 996, 996 (July 6, 1990). 
128. See Genentech's President's Wife Settles SEC Charges She Tipped Brother, 22 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1624, 1624-25 (Nov. 23, 1990). 
129. See, e.g., DANIEL AKST, WONDER BOY: BARRY MINKOW-THE KID WHO SWIN· 
DLED WALL STREET 4-6 (1990) (investors, banks, and creditors lost at least $100 million 
where company's alleged service business was virtually nonexistent). 
130. See, e.g., Eddie Antar, Litig. Release No. 12,548, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ff 95,341, at 96,655, 96,655-56 (July 18, 1990) (judgment entered in absentia 
against CEO for $73.5 million). 
131. See SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. 
Cayman Islands Reins. Corp., 734 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1984). 
132. E.g., SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 65 (D. Conn. 1988) (law-
yer-defendant performed several unlawful acts in connection with client's public offering), 
aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990). 
133. See DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & Co.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING SCAN• 
DAL 11 (1987) (investment banker made $11.6 million in net profits by trading on information 
secured from his own clients, as well as information purchased from his friends); LEVINE, 
supra note 110, at 17 (Levine contending his net profits were $10.6 million). 
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value in order to facilitate a significant fraud on investors134 might quite 
reasonably be subject to disqualification from serving as an officer or di-
rector of a public company as well as to other civil and criminal sanc-
tions. It generally will be more appropriate, however, for professional 
misconduct to be addressed through a carefully drawn injunction and the 
professional disciplinary process than through entry of a Remedies Act 
order. 135 Defendants who have never served as public company officers 
or directors, or whose misconduct is wholly unrelated to their executive 
status, should only rarely be candidates for an executive suspension or 
bar. 
4. The Defendant's Degree of Scienter 
In deciding whether to enter an injunction in pre-Remedies Act 
cases, courts routinely looked to the defendant's "degree of scienter,"136 
both in connection with the immediate violation and in connection with 
extrinsic misconduct. 137 Not surprisingly, in these cases courts were 
more likely to enjoin defendants if their violations of the securities laws 
were intentional than if their conduct was merely reckless or grossly neg-
ligent. 138 Similarly, in criminal cases courts have cited the presence of 
premeditation and the defendant's leadership role in the crime-both of 
which are indicators of scienter-as appropriate elements in determining 
punishment. 139 
Under the Remedies Act, a court cannot enter a suspension or bar 
order absent a finding of scienter. 140 To warrant this finding, a defend-
ant's conduct may be intentional but, at a minimum, it must be 
134. See, e.g., $80 Million Settlement by E.S.M. Auditor Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987, 
§ 1, at 37 (reporting that audit partner accepted bribes to certify false financial statements of 
E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc. in a scheme that cost investors $320 million; he was later 
sentenced to 12 years in prison). 
135. Professionals who also serve as corporate officers or directors may be subject to sanc-
tions in both capacities. See, e.g., Saul Bluestone, Litig. Release No. 12,589, [1990 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1!95,423, at 97,138, 97,139 (Aug. 22, 1990) (SEC alleging 
that lawyer traded on inside information acquired while serving on a corporate board); In re 
Reich, 128 A.D.2d 329, 331, 515 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (1987) (striking lawyer from the roll of 
attorneys after being convicted of insider trading). 
136. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 
u.s. 834 (1977). 
137. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980) ("An important factor in [the deci-
sion to enjoin future conduct] is the degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's 
past conduct."). 
138. See, e.g., SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980). 
139. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
140. Scienter is a necessary element of claims under§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, see Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976), and of claims under§ 17(a)(1) of the Securi-
ties Act, see Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697. 
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"highly unreasonable, involving not merely simple, or even in-
excusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defend-
ant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of 
it."141 
A court considering whether to enter a Remedies Act order may 
wish to take note whether the defendant's misconduct was clearly inten-
tional-as in the case of the CEO who traded on inside information 
through accounts created for that purpose in his wife's maiden name, 142 
or the broker who defrauded his customers by sending them falsified 
profit statements while secretly pocketing their money143-or merely the 
consequence of mismanagement. 144 Positioning the defendant some-
where on the scienter continuum helps the court to focus on the funda-
mental question posed by the substantial-unfitness standard: whether the 
defendant is likely to continue to engage in fraudulent conduct regardless 
of where she is employed. 145 Courts in other contexts have frequently 
cited incidents of blatant, intentional fraud as especially significant 
predictors of future unlawful behavior. 146 
A subissue may arise in the scienter inquiry: whether the defendant 
deliberately flouted regulatory warnings that his conduct was unlaw-
ful. 147 Cases in which the defendant was made expressly aware of the 
illegality of his actions, but continued them, may present particularly 
strong arguments for entry of a Remedies Act order. In any event, the 
141. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.) (quoting 
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). 
142. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 441-42 (9th Cir. 1990). 
143. See United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1991). 
144. See, e.g., FDIC v. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 432 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding 
bank liable as an aider and abettor to customer's fraud where bank had ample evidence cus· 
tomer was dealing in stolen property, and many bank employees had urged terminating the 
customer's accounts but were overruled by bank executives). 
145. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text. 
146. Cf. SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 649 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that "fraudulent 
conduct in the past will give rise to an inference of continued future violations"); SEC v. J&B 
Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974) (same); In re Application of K.B., 291 
Md. 170, 178, 434 A.2d 541, 545 {1981) (" '[T]here can be no doubt ••. that thievery of a 
repetitive nature, as here, is usually indicative of a serious character flaw.'") (quoting In re 
Application of David H., 283 Md. 632, 640-41, 392 A.2d 83, 88 {1978)). 
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 78 (D.C. Cir.) ("Ignoring warn· 
ings of possible violations is relevant [to the question] whether to grant an injunction."), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1969){uphold· 
ing injunction when, following notification by the SEC that their unregistered offering was 
unlawful, defendants proceeded to make an additional, similar offering), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 
972 (1970). 
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court should give careful consideration to the question of the defendant's 
state of mind. 
5. The Defendant's Economic Stake in the Violation 
The proceeds question-whether the defendant personally profited 
from her violation of the securities law-is another appropriate consider-
ation in evaluating the propriety of an executive suspension or bar order 
under the Remedies Act. 148 Some securities-law violators, such as tip-
pers who do not trade, 149 receive no cash benefits from their misconduct 
while others, such as those who misappropriate the proceeds of a securi-
ties offering or loot a corporation's treasury, 150 certainly do. Lack of an 
economic stake need not insulate defendants from entry of a Remedies 
Act order, but the presence of an economic stake in a scheme to defraud 
investors should serve as an aggravating factor tending to favor such an 
order. 
6. The Likelihood That Misconduct Will Recur 
At the core of any inquiry into whether a defendant is substantially 
unfit to serve as a corporate officer or director is the question whether he 
is likely to continue to engage in fraudulent conduct. Repeated prior 
misconduct may be one-indeed the best-predictor of later fraudulent 
behavior.151 The more interesting question arises when the defendant 
has no track record of abuse of his corporate position but is a first-time, 
albeit "egregious," offender. Criminologists who have studied recidivism 
among white collar offenders have some, though as yet not much, intelli-
gence to offer on this question. 
Contrary to widely held assumptions that white collar offenders sel-
dom recidivate, recent studies show that many of them. have a history of 
unlawful conduct. For example, among a sample of defendants con-
victed of securities fraud, 27.6% had prior criminal convictions, 152 and 
148. See, e.g., SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 69 (D. Conn. 1988) 
(noting in support of an enforcement injunction that the attorney-defendant had received a 
$15,000 fee traceable directly to his violation of the securities law), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. 
Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 3228 (1990). 
149. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding nontrading tippers liable under rule 10b-5). 
150. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that defend-
ants had, without disclosure, used proceeds of stock offering to finance real estate venture and 
interest in speculative new issues), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reins. Corp., 734 
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1984). 
151. See infra notes 152-55, 159 and accompanying text. 
152. Stanton Wheeler et al., White Collar Crimes and Criminals, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
331, 345 (1988). 
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4% had previously been sentenced to jail. 153 Among the same sample 
population, 32% had a prior arrest record and 11% had two or more 
prior arrests. 154 
Of course, looking to recidivists' criminal histories and finding pat-
terns of misconduct retrospectively does not permit one to make predic-
tions of future misconduct from current unlawful behavior. We do 
know, however, that "evidence of criminal careers can be found even 
within a highly restricted 'population of elite white-collar offenders."155 
How one identifies the potential for "career" criminality and measures 
that potential for a given defendant is precisely the problem that the 
Remedies Act presents. 
Some theorists suggest that people who violate the securities laws 
are little different from street criminals-they are "relatively unable or 
unwilling to delay gratification; they are relatively indifferent to punish-
ment and to the interests of others."156 In more concrete terms, "[t]he 
securities-fraud offender should have been a youthful mugger but missed 
the boat."157 Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction between the 
demographic characteristics and the recidivism rates of securities law vi-
olators and those of street-crime offenders. 158 The demographic distinc-
tions may be attributable in part to the fact that a securities law violator 
by definition requires higher educational attainment and a higher-status 
employment position to effectuate her crime than a street thug requires 
to grab a victim's purse. The reason securities law violators have a lower 
recidivism rate may be that securities law violations typically depend on 
153. David Weisburd et al., White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Some Preliminary 
Findings, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 342, 346 (1990). Other white collar crimes correlated even 
more closely with prior criminal activity. For example, among tax offenders, 43.2% had a 
prior criminal record, Wheeler et al., supra note 152, at 345, and 14% had done jail time, 
Weisburd et al., supra, at 346. 
154. Weisburd et al., supra note 153, at 346. In a separate study of individuals whom the 
SEC investigated for securities law violations, at least half had been investigated on one or 
more previous occasions by the SEC, FBI, or other law enforcement agencies, usually for 
securities fraud. SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITALISI'S 39 (1984). 
155. Weisburd et al., supra note 153, at 347. 
156. Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Causes of White Collar Crime, 25 CRIMINOL· 
OGY 949, 959-60 (1987). 
157. DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE COLLAR OF· 
FENDERS IN THE FEDERAL CoURTS 187 (1991). 
158. For example, securities law violators are far more likely than street crime offenders to 
be white, to be employed, and specifically to be employed in a white collar job. The average 
age of a securities law violator is 44, considerably older than the typical street crime offender. 
Weisburd et al., supra note 153, at 344-45. As for recidivism, securities law violators have a 
prior arrest rate of 32%, id., while street crime offenders have a far higher prior arrest rate. A 
sample of New York City felony defendants in 1971 revealed that almost 66% had prior arrest 
records and 33% had prior felony convictions. Id. at 348 & n.6. 
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the creation or exploitation of an organization, and do not lend them-
selves to the sort of unaccompanied, impulsive behavior often character-
istic of street crimes. 
In addition to being easily distinguishable from street criminals, se-
curities law violators may be distinguishable from other white collar of-
fenders in ways important for the application of the Remedies Act. 
Specifically, securities law violators may be more prone to repeat their 
abuses than are other white collar offenders. David Weisburd, a crimi-
nologist at Rutgers University, has been following the careers of several 
hundred white collar offenders following their convictions for white col-
lar crimes. His preliminary findings indicate that the securities law viola-
tors in his sample have a higher rate of post-conviction "failures" than 
the total sample. 159 These failures, however, may often represent con-
duct quite different from that involved in the original conviction. That 
is, those white collar offenders who recidivate often diversify into new 
territories of wrongdoing, and their post-conviction conduct may include 
offenses unrelated to their earlier crime(s).160 
In short, little is yet known about the likelihood of recidivism 
among first-time white collar offenders generally, or securities law viola-
tors specifically. 161 Experts do concede that white collar misconduct, 
like street crime, declines with age. 162 Many also agree that a stigma of 
the sort that the Remedies Act imposes, like that resulting from incarcer-
ation, may well encourage future unlawful behavior rather than, as in-
tended, discourage it. 163 
159. Telephone Interview with David Weisburd, Criminologist, Rutgers University (Sept. 
26, 1991). 
160. The criminal histories of convicted white collar offenders tend to disprove the notion 
that offenders "specialize" in a particular type of crime. In fact, "[o]nly one in five white-
collar offenders with prior records have previously been convicted of a white-collar crime" of 
any sort. WEISBURD et al., supra note 157, at 66; see also MICHAEL R. GOTI'FREDSON & 
TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 189 (1990) ("[T]here is little reason to 
think tl!at the idea of specialization in white collar offenses will bear fruit."). But see Weisburd 
et al., supra note 153, at 349, 352 (suggesting that securities law violators, more than other 
white collar criminals, may engage in a relatively high degree of specialization). 
161. Telephone Interview with David Weisburd, supra note 159 ("very little is known 
about the recidivism of white-collar offenders"); Telephone Interview with Michael Benson, 
Criminologist, University of Tennessee (Sept. 27, 1991) ("there isn't much [scholarship] that is 
predictive or useful"); see also Terrill R. Holland et al., Comparison and Combination of 
Clinical and Statistical Predictions of Recidivism Among Adult Offenders, 68 J. APPLIED 
PSYCH. 203, 203 (1983) ("[R]ecidivism has been resistant to highly accurate prediction, despite 
numerous and elaborate efforts to accomplish this purpose."). 
162. GOTI'FREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 160, at 193 (comparing age distributions for 
murder with those for fraud and embezzlement). This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that a single career offender slackens off as he grows older. 
163. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 123, 135 (1989) (ar-
guing that stigmatization may result in defendants' developing a desire to get back at the 
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What this means is that federal district courts confronted with an 
SEC request for a Remedies Act order will have to do what courts have 
always done in similar circumstances: trust their instincts. 164 When 
there is no prior record to review, courts will have to "view [the defend-
ant's] whole life history and his place in society."165 They will have to 
assess not only the defendant's fraudulent conduct, but also his motives 
in getting caught up in the fraud, his subsequent cooperation with the 
government, and the stability of his family support system. 166 The pro-
cess is necessarily inexact, but not one foreign to experienced trial judges. 
The problem with this process, in addition to its being subject to 
individual judicial prejudices, is that it inherently tilts in favor of over-
sanctioning. In his book Occupational Crime, Gary S. Green argues that 
selective incapacitation schemes, such as that presented by the Remedies 
Act, inevitably result in courts sanctioning defendants for whom incapac-
itation is unnecessary ("false positives") far more often than they fail to 
sanction defendants for whom incapacitation is appropriate ("false nega-
tives"). 167 This simply means that judges must exercise self-restraint in 
system or joining, with other outcasts, a subculture of resistance and illegality); see also Toni 
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1934-35 
(1991) (arguing that, because of their residential and occupational mobility, middle class de-
fendants often find "shaming" punishments ineffective). 
164. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 10 (1988) (describing the sentencing process as one permeated 
with the personal values and sentiments of the sentencing judge). · 
165. /d. at 102 (quoting federal judge on how he determines sentence for a white-collar 
offender). 
166. /d. at 102-20 (discussing these criteria as employed by judges in determining sentences 
and quoting various judges with regard to same). 
167. Green states: 
Selective occupational disqualification [bars] individuals from certain future occupa-
tional activities on a case-by-case basis. However, selective incapacitation is predi-
cated upon the idea that one can accurately predict which persons need to be 
incapacitated. This assumption is often incorrect, and the ramifications of an incor-
rect prediction are substantial. First, there is the person who is predicted to be a 
nonrecidivist and is allowed to continue in the same occupational role, who then 
commits another occupational crime. This person is known as a "false negative" (the 
offender was predicted to be negative on the future criminality trait, but that predic-
tion was false). An error on the other side would involve the person who is predicted 
to be an occupational recidivist and is disqualified on that basis, but, had that person 
not been disqualified by being allowed to continue in occupation, no new crimes 
would have been committed. This situation represents a "false positive" (the person 
was predicted to be positive on the future criminality trait, but that prediction was 
false). The result of the false negative is an additional offense (or several of them). 
The result of the false positive is the infliction of punishment on persons who need 
not have received that sanction . 
. . . Because incapacitation is rooted in crime control, there will be a tendency to 
concentrate on the avoidance of false negatives when predicting individual recidi-
vism. This emphasis naturally increases the number of false positives, because when 
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identifying defendants whom they find "substantially unfit,'' lest they 
oversanction. 
7. The Defendant's Appreciation of an Executive's Fiduciary 
Obligations 
Interwoven among all of the foregoing issues is a fundamental-and 
perhaps unanswerable--question: as a result of her experiences, does the 
defendant comprehend and has she internalized the necessary notions of 
fiduciary obligation and the standards of care within which executives 
must operate? In pre-Remedies Act proceedings, courts often framed 
this issue as one of contrition. 168 There is more, however, to the appreci-
ation issue than the presence of remorse. 169 Defendants must show, 
through testimony and practice, that they have affirmatively embraced 
the special and demanding role of an officer or director of a public 
company. 
I do not suggest that, in this context, courts quiz defendants on the 
principles of corporate governance or that they send defendants to the 
securities law equivalent of drunk drivers• school. I do suggest, however, 
that (1) a court satisfy itself that the defendant is at least as worthy of 
investor trust and confidence as are corporate executives of other public 
the prognosticator is unsure about whether an offender will commit another crime, 
recidivism is likely to be overpredicted. In other words, when in doubt, believe the 
worst, because underestimating recidivism inflicts more crime. Thus, with selective 
occupational disqualification, there will be a natural tendency for false positives to 
outnumber false negatives. False positives are particularly likely to increase immedi-
ately after a false negative is discovered (parole boards are more cautious in granting 
paroles after one of their releasees has been involved in a serious crime). 
GARY S. GREEN, OCCUPATIONAL CRIME 248 (1990). 
168. See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that defendant 
"insisted that he had done nothing wrong"); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d ·1082, 
1101 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendants maintained their conduct was blameless even though the dis-
trict court had found their violations to be " 'willful, blatant, and often completely outra-
geous'") (quoting SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)); 
SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendants insisted throughout the 
trial that their conduct was lawful and that the offering did not fall within the Act's registra-
tion requirements), cert denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 
F. Supp. 53, 69 (D. Conn. 1988) (defendant's conduct at trial showed "callous indifference" to 
his wrongdoing), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 
3228 (1990). 
169. White collar criminals often fail to express remorse, instead rationalizing their wrong-
doing with explanations such as "that's the way business is done," "I didn't mean to steal the 
money, just to borrow it," or "this wasn't murder, after all." See, e.g., Michael L. Benson, 
Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOL-
OGY 583, 589-98 (1985). White collar criminals as a group generally do not have criminal self-
images. GREEN, supra note 167, at 240; Robert Meier & Gilbert Geis, The Psychology of the 
White Collar Offender, in ON WHITE CoLLAR CRIME 85, 96 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1982). 
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companies, and (2) the defendant bear the burden of persuasion on this 
ultimate issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Remedies Act-as it was intended to be-is a potent new 
weapon for the SEC. Arguing that a defendant is substantially unfit to 
serve as an executive in any public company may well assist the Commis-
sion in extracting favorable prelitigation settlements. Sometimes, how-
ever, this leverage will fail, and the issue of executive unfitness will have 
to be considered on its merits. The stakes will be high. For many de-
fendants, the imposition of a Remedies Act order may be more burden-
some and life-altering than a typical securities violation prison sentence 
would be. 170 
In deciding the substantial-unfitness issue, federal courts will be de-
termining who is a suitable candidate for high corporate office and who is 
not. One need not agree that the Remedies Act is ill considered to recog-
nize the challenge that federal courts inevitably will face in making that 
determination. This Article attempts to assist courts in that process, 
while cautioning that simplistic reference to non-Remedies Act jurispru-
dence may lead to inappropriate results. 
170. For example, the median prison sentence for defendants convicted of securities fraud 
has been calculated to be 12 months. WEISBURD et al., supra note 157, at 131. In contrast, a 
Remedies Act order can prevent a person from being a corporate officer or director for life. 
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 77t(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991); id. § 78u(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). 
